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ENFORCEMENT ACTIVISM OF THE EU’S
RENEWABLE ENERGY DIRECTIVE DURING
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
JON TRUBY*
INTRODUCTION
The American “shale revolution”1 has been an economic blessing
in a troubled time,2 a blessing the EU (“European Union”) has largely not
enjoyed.3 It may prove, however, to have been a double-edged sword. If
the focus on expanding shale exploration alleviated energy independence
concerns4 to the extent that renewable energy goals were deferred and
consequently GhG (greenhouse gas) emissions could not be reduced, then
the long-term outcome of the economic blessing may be an environmental
curse.5 Meanwhile, foregoing the economic benefits of a non-renewable
energy revolution and suffering from the economic downturn maintained
* Jon Truby, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Law and Policy at the College of Law,
Qatar University.
1 For the commercial exploitation of shale gas and oil, see Shale Oil and Shale Gas
Resources Are Globally Abundant, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 10, 2013), http://www
.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11611. With the exploitation of shale gas and energy,
the International Energy Agency predicts the United States will become energy indepen-
dent and the world’s biggest oil producer by 2020, and a net energy exporter by 2035, a
major shift from it currently having to import twenty percent of its oil. World Energy
Outlook 2012, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 1–2 (2012), http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org
/media/weowebsite/2012/WEO2012_Renewables.pdf; see also Technically Recoverable Shale
Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries
Outside the United States, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies
/worldshalegas/ (last updated June 13, 2013).
2 Global Economic Prospects, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/PF6VWYXS10 (last
visited Mar. 27, 2014); The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST
(Sept. 7, 2013), available at http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects
-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article.
3 Public opinion and political uncertainty has limited the EU’s shale production and ex-
ploration. See John Aglionby, Europe Split on Benefits of Drilling for Shale Gas, FIN. TIMES
(June 27, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3319fd84-df1d-11e2-881f-00144feab7de.html
#axzz2uG8KrfeZ.
4 Clifford Krauss & Eric Lipton, U.S. Inches Toward Goal of Energy Independence, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.relooney.info/0_New_13164.pdf.
5 Letter from Martin A. Apple, Council of Scientific Society Presidents, to President of the
United States Barack Obama (May 4, 2010).
695
696 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 38:695
pressure on the EU to reduce net energy imports and GhG emissions has
ensured it has been unnerving in its renewable energy drive.6
Only three days after a €10 billion bailout of the Government of
Cyprus in March 2013 by EU Member States,7 the European Commis-
sion asked the European Court Justice for a daily penalty on Cyprus of
€11,404.808 for “failing to transpose” EU renewable energy legislation.9
Reporting non-compliance and seeking severe state fines in the European
Courts at a time of government bailouts, the forcefulness of the European
Commission in preventing and punishing infringements of renewable
energy agreements has ascended its status to be an environmental cham-
pion in a time of European turmoil and lack of unity.10 This Article eval-
uates the European Commission’s enforcement measures of EU renewable
energy law throughout the global financial crisis and considers the meth-
ods it has used. It considers that the financial crisis has only amplified
the EU’s push for energy independence, which has empowered the Com-
mission to go unrestricted in seeking compliance of its renewable energy
legislation—with the threat of stringent penalties for even those member
states in severe economic or political crises.
I. BACKGROUND
Reducing over-dependence on imported energy to save expensive
national costs whilst minimizing GhGs were priorities11 for both the EU
and the United States prior to the 2008 global downturn, but the harsh
budgetary cut-backs demanded by these two unions suffering limited
6 Stephen Castle, Europe, Facing Economic Pain, May Ease Climate Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/23/business/international/european-union
-lowers-ambitions-on-renewable-energy.html.
7 Government of Cyprus Ministry of Finance Announcement, Agreement for a Financial
Assistance to the Republic of Cyprus (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/mof.nsf
/All/BB670607715A44D6C2257B3200368FE9/$file/agreemenfinancialassistance.pdf.
8 Press Release, European Comm’n, Renewable Energy: Commission Refers Poland and
Cyprus to Court for Failing to Transpose EU Rules (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.ecb.europa
.eu/ecb/html/crisis.en.html [hereinafter Renewable Energy].
9 Id.
10 See generally Key Dates of the Financial Crisis, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, http://www
.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/html/crisis.en.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2014); Niamh Moloney, EU
Financial Market Regulation After the Global Financial Crisis: “More Europe” or More
Risks? (2010), 1317, 1330 (2010).
11 See John Edwards, Achieving Energy Independence & Stopping Global Warming
Through a New Energy Economy (2007), 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2007).
2014] ENFORCEMENT ACTIVISM 697
growth ensured that both parties remained focused on achieving energy
independence.12 The constant attention during 2007–2013 towards re-
solving economic crises13 across Europe and America may have reduced
policy priorities of achieving environmental goals,14 and even made the
case for commercial shale exploration, which had previously been limited
due to these environmental goals.15 With the EU opting not16 to follow
the United States’ economically successful17 lead on shale,18 EU enforce-
ment policy could have permitted a lax approach towards Member States
failing to fully comply with renewable energy objectives at a time of se-
vere financial difficulty, when governments and major banks were being
rescued across Europe.19
12 A study by IHS Consulting predicts that unconventional oil and gas production will
reduce the United States’ trade deficit one third by 2020. America’s New Energy Future:
The Unconventional Oil & Gas Revolution and the US Economy, IHS (Oct. 2012) http://
www.ihs.com/info/ecc/a/americas-new-energy-future-report-vol-3.aspx.
13 Daniel W. Dreznera & Kathleen R. McNamara, International Political Economy, Global
Financial Orders and the 2008 Financial Crisis, 11 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 155
(2013); Stijn Claessens, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan, & Luc Laeve, Cross-Country
Experiences and Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis, 25 ECON POL’Y 62,
267–93 (2010).
14 Sonia van Gilder Cooke, Will Austerity Derail Europe’s Clean Energy Movement?, TIME
(Feb. 10, 2012), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2106390,00.html; see
also Benjamin K. Sovacool, Energy Policy and Climate Change, in THE HANDBOOK OF
GLOBAL CLIMATE AND ENERGY POLICY 450–51 (Robert Falkner ed., 2013).
15 Elmar Altvater & Margot Geiger, Exiting the Multiple Crises Through ‘Green’ Growth?,
in MULTIPLE CRISES IN LAND AND RESOURCE USE (Andreas Exner et al. eds., 2013); Marek
Strzelecki & Brian Swint, Europe Nears First Commercial Shale Gas Production in Poland,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 23, 2014, 12:12 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-23
/europe-nears-first-commercial-shale-gas-production-in-poland-1-.html.
16 Fiona Harvey, Sir David King Warns Against Fracking, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/sep/16/david-king-fracking-shale-gas.
17 The United States shale boom has helped the United States in its economic recovery
through job creation, investment, revenues, and by providing an inexpensive source of
energy that has helped keep United States’ manufacturing costs low. See Shale Gas: A
Renaissance in US Manufacturing?, PWC (Dec. 4, 2011), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us
/industrial-products/assets/pwc-shale-gas-us-manufacturing-renaissance.pdf.
18 Production costs were found to be much higher outside of North America. A study by
IHS Consulting predicts that unconventional oil and gas production will reduce the
United States’ trade deficit one third by 2020. America’s New Energy Future: The Uncon-
ventional Oil & Gas Revolution and the US Economy, IHS, http://www.ihs.com/info/ecc/a
/americas-new-energy-future-report-vol-3.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
19 Alex Cukierman, Monetary Policy and Institutions Before, During, and After the Global
Financial Crisis, 9 J. FIN. STABILITY 373, 374 (2013).
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An overview of recent legal enforcement action demonstrates that
the Commission’s legal pursuit has been unfaltering.20 The Commission
has sought enforcement including punishments upon even those Member
States in severe financial crises, representing a broader policy to achieve
energy sustainability in the long term through self-sufficiency of renew-
able energy, reduced consumption, and reduced imports.21
II. EU RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY
Importing twice as much energy as the United States,22 the EU’s
dependence on foreign energy consumption is expected to rise from 50%
to 70% by 2025.23 The EU has long been keen to reduce dependence on for-
eign energy,24 but the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent austerity25
measures made cost-saving imperative.26 A switch to renewable energy is
therefore an attractive option for the EU.27 Besides cost-saving, there are
further significant advantages to this option too, importantly that switching
to renewable energy causes fewer GhG emissions than in the production
of non-renewable energy, enabling it to achieve its global GhG targets.28
The process of the transition also creates significant technical job oppor-
tunities and investment, and in developing a renewable energy industry
20 Legal Enforcement: Complaints, Petitions and Other Sources of Infringement Information,
EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/complaints.htm (last updated
Jan. 24, 2014).
21 Press Release, European Comm’n, Environment: Six Member State Face Court for Fail-
ing to Put EU Laws on Their Statute Books (June 3, 2010), http://europa.eu/rapid/press
-release_IP-10-686_en.htm?locale=en.
22 Id.
23 Christophe-Alexandre Paillard, Rethinking Russia: Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy
Dependence, 63 J. INT’L AFF. 65 (2010); see also European Commission, Annex to the
Green Paper, A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, What
Is at Stake—Background Document, at 17, COM (2006) 105 final (2006) [hereinafter
Annex to the Green Paper].
24 Gawdat Bahgat, Europe’s Energy Security: Challenges and Opportunities, 82 INT’L AFF.
961, 963–64 (2006); Debra Johnson, EU-Russian Energy Links: A Marriage of Convenience?,
40 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 256, 262–66 (2005).
25 See David Lodge & Marta Rodriguez-Vives, How Long Can Austerity Persist? The Factors
That Sustain Fiscal Consolidations, 2 EUR. J. GOV’T & ECON. 5, 6 (2013).
26 JEREMY RIFKIN, THE THIRD INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: HOW LATERAL POWER IS TRANS-
FORMING ENERGY, THE ECONOMY, AND THE WORLD 37–39, 43 (2013).
27 European Commission Green Paper, A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive
and Secure Energy, at 11–12, SEC (2006) 317, COM (2006) 105 final (Mar. 8, 2006).
28 Life Cycle Assessment Harmonization Results and Findings, NATIONAL RENEWABLE
ENERGY LABORATORY, http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/sustain_lca_results.html (last updated
Oct. 17, 2013).
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it can enable the EU to export its expertise and manufactured equipment
to other countries.29 In this rapidly growing industry, the EU has the
chance to become a global player.30 Embracing renewables to produce en-
ergy more efficiently, the EU Energy Commissioner emphasized these
advantages, announcing that “[r]enewables are a solution to global cli-
mate change, European economic growth, and security of supply issues.”31
III. ENFORCEMENT ACTIVISM AND THE RENEWABLE
ENERGY DIRECTIVE
The Renewable Energy Directive32 placed obligations, including
regulatory changes and national targets, on EU Member States to help
the EU source twenty percent of its energy from renewable sources33 by
2020.34 Member States also needed to cut GhG emissions by twenty per-
cent as compared to 1990 levels by 2020.35 It had been long in the plan-
ning and finally enacted in 2009 at a time when Member States may
have been inclined to reduce regulatory burdens in an effort to aid busi-
ness during the peak of the economic downturn.36 Adding such pressure
and compliance costs on Member States could have been regarded as a
contentious act during the recession,37 but the Commission focused on its
29 EUROPEAN RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, EUROPEAN RENEWABLE ENERGY EXPORT
STRATEGY 2, 4, available at http://www.erec.org/fileadmin/erec_docs/Projcet_Documents
/EUREES/DEFINITIF_EXPORT.pdf.
30 ECOTEC, RENEWABLE ENERGY SECTOR IN THE EU: ITS EMPLOYMENT AND EXPORT
POTENTIAL: A FINAL REPORT TO DG ENVIRONMENT 17, available at http://ec.europa.eu
/environment/enveco/eco_industry/pdf/ecotec_renewable_energy.pdf.
31 Renewable Energy, supra note 8.
32 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009
on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and Amending and Sub-
sequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 16.
33 Specifically wind, solar, hydro-electric and tidal power, and geothermal energy and
biomass. Renewable Energy: What Do We Want to Achieve?, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
34 LEONARDO MASSAI, EUROPEAN CLIMATE AND CLEAN ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 110 (2012).
35 Id. at 184.
36 Damian Carrington, Environmental Regulations Set to Be Slashed, THE GUARDIAN
(Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/mar/16/environmental
-regulations-slashed-red-tape; Cristina Arellano, Juan Carlos Conesa, & Timothy J. Kehoe,
Chronic Sovereign Debt Crises in the Eurozone, 2010–2012, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS (May 2012), http://pareto.uab.es/jconesa/research/ArellanoConesaKehoeMpls
FedEpp.pdf.
37 Fabio Serrichio et al., Euroscepticism and the Global Financial Crisis, 51 J. COMMON
MARKET STUD. 51, 52 (2013).
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long-term strategy.38 Its policy was a determined effort to reduce net im-
ports of energy and switch to renewable sources, to save import costs, and
reduce GhG emissions, amongst other benefits.39 Since then, the Commis-
sion indiscriminately enforced this legislation through the European
Court of Justice (having failed to fully reach targets under previous re-
newable energy legislation),40 ensuring that Member States remained
focused on achieving their targets and were not distracted by other
events.41 This, alongside with the ability of the European Court of Justice
to issue punishments, demonstrates the vital importance placed upon the
endgame of a twenty percent renewable energy achievement, over many
other major EU objectives.42 Energy sustainability, it seems, is para-
mount to the success of the EU,43 and not even a near-bankruptcy of a
Member State has been a permissible excuse for the European Commis-
sion to lose sight of that goal.
The Commission’s persistence is evident in their repeated use of
“reasoned opinions” to oblige Member States to comply.44 Reasoned
opinions are the penultimate stage in the EU’s infringement procedures
before court action,45 commonly giving Member States two months to
comply or be issued with proceedings at the European Court of Justice.46
France and the Czech Republic were both sent reasoned opinions in 2011
for failing to inform the Commission of activities that are required to
comply with two key areas of Directive.47 They were overdue in their
38 European Commission, Green Paper, Towards a European Strategy for the Security of
Energy Supply, at 2, COM (2000) 769 final (Nov. 29, 2000).
39 Annex to the Green Paper, supra note 23, at 3.
40 See Stuart Hohnen, The 2009 EU Renewables Directive—How Binding Is ‘Binding’?,
ENERGY POLICY BLOG (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.energypolicyblog.com/2010/09/13/the
-2009-eu-renewables-directive-%E2%80%93-how-binding-is-%E2%80%98binding%E2
%80%99/.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See generally Angus Johnston & Guy Block, EU ENERGY LAW (2012); MASSAI, supra note
34, at 1–3. Further EU strategies are discussed in Jon Truby, Maritime Emissions Taxation:
An Alternative to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme?, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 310 (2014).
44 Enforcing EU Energy Law: Infringement Decisions, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa
.eu/energy/infringements/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
45 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012. art. 258, O.J. (C 326).
46 Infringement Cases, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/press
_en.htm (last updated Jan. 24, 2014).
47 Press Release, European Comm’n, Renewable Energy: French and Czech Legislation
Still Not in Line with EU Rules (Nov. 24, 2011), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP
-11-1446_en.htm?locale=en.
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communication, which they were required to do by December 5, 2010
(pursuant to Article 27(1)).48 Article 16 (access to and operation of the
grids) of the Renewable Energy Directive required Member States to
open up access to their national electricity grid to both competition and
more varied (specifically renewable) energy sources through legislative,
administrative, and infrastructure modifications.49 The Commission also
required an explanation of their Article 17 (sustainability criteria for bio-
fuels and bioliquids) compliance activities, requiring Member States to
produce biofuels in a sustainable fashion.50 Given that member states are
bound by Article 27(2) to communicate the legislative reforms adopted
pursuant to the Renewable Energy Directive, the lack of notification of
compliance activities could only lead the Commission to assume that the
required reforms had not been carried out.51 Ensuring France met its
target was a particularly important objective of the Commission, given
both the size of France’s national grid and the fact that its target of hav-
ing twenty-three percent of its energy consumption produced from renew-
able energy by 2020 (compared to 2005 levels) would make a considerable
contribution to the overall target, even exceeding the EU’s overall target
of twenty percent.52
The use of reasoned opinions as a final step before court action
has been commonplace for the Commission on the issue of enforcing the
Renewable Energy Directive. Hungary, Luxembourg53 Finland, Poland,
Greece,54 Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, Slovenia,55 Austria, Bulgaria,56 Bel-
gium, and Estonia57 have also been issued reasoned opinions for failing
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 National targets are contained in ANNEX I, A of the Directive. See ANNEX I, A,
Directive 2009/28, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the
Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and Amending and Subsequently
Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (L 140).
53 Press Release, European Comm’n, November Infringements Package: Main Decisions,
¶ 11 (Nov. 21, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-876_en.htm.
54 Press Release, European Comm’n, Renewable Energy: Finnish, Greek and Polish Leg-
islation Still Not in Line with EU Rules (Mar. 22, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press
-release_IP-12-278_en.htm?locale=fr [hereinafter Finnish, Greek and Polish Legislation].
55 Press Release, European Comm’n, Renewable Energy: National Legislation in 4
Member States Still Not in Line with EU Rules (June 21, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid
/press-release_IP-12-640_en.htm?locale=fr [hereinafter Renewable Energy].
56 November Infringement, supra note 53.
57 Press Release, European Comm’n, May Infringements Package: Main Decisions, (May 30,
2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-470_en.htm.
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to communicate to the Commission how they would apply the Directive
into national law.58 Following repeated offenses from such a large propor-
tion of member states, the Commission warned that “unnecessary delays
in implementing it may jeopardize the achievement of the EU renewable
energy objective”59—something it sees as paramount for a more sustain-
able and competitive Europe.60
A. Penalties
The threat of being referred to the European Court of Justice for
enforcement may often be enough to stimulate compliance, and the pub-
lic may never hear more about the proceedings (or indeed view the con-
tents of the reasoned opinion).61 However, the Commission has shown a
willingness to punish non-compliance following the expiry of their warn-
ing deadline.62 The Commission first refers the case to the European
Court of Justice which makes a judgement determining whether EU
legislation has been breached.63 If so, the court orders the infringing
Member State to comply, and if the Member State does not comply with
the judgement, the Commission returns to seek a second judgment and
financial penalty.64
The penalties which the Commission can pursue through the Court
can be significant.65 Since the Renewable Energy Directive itself does not
provide for specific penalties, the Commission instead seeks penalties
through the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union66 for in-
fringement of the Court of Justice’s judgement on EU law generally.67
Indeed, the Commission is itself responsible for specifying the quantity
58 See November Infringements Package, supra note 53; Finnish, Greek and Polish Leg-
islation, supra note 54; Renewable Energy, supra note 55; May Infringements Package,
supra note 57.
59 See Renewable Energy, supra note 55.
60 See id.
61 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30
May 2001 Regarding Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission
Documents, O.J. (L 145) (2001).
62 See generally 20:20 KEEP ON TRACK, http://www.keepontrack.eu (last visited Mar. 27,
2014).
63 For guidance on enforcement procedures, see id.
64 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 260(2), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J.
(C 326).
65 See generally id.
66 See generally id.
67 Id.
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of any penalty it believes the Court should issue, though ultimately the
decision on the extent of the penalty is that of the court.68 The Commis-
sion has a formula it uses to calculate the requested penalty payment69
based on the severity and duration70 of the infringement.71 It is further
guided by the infringing Member State’s influence in decision-making
(based on its voting rights in the Council of Europe72) as well as its
“capacity to pay.”73 The objective of this method is to ensure that the
economic reality of a Member State is taken into account, so that it is
capable of paying a fine which punishes the Member State but does not
go as far as to over burden it.74
In the case of Cyprus, the formula utilized to determine Cyprus’
capacity to pay a fine may have resulted in an unnecessarily harsh
penalty proposal by the Commission. The formula used was as follows75:
The issue arises in exactly which GDP figures for Cyprus were
utilized in the formula; indeed there is no indication in any of the Com-
mission Communications referenced as to which GDP figures the Com-
mission ought to use to calculate the appropriate penalty for Cyprus.76 If
this calculation is based on quarterly GDP figures, the actual GDP of
Cyprus at the time of the penalty proposal may have been considerably
lower than the figures used. The banking crisis in Cyprus led to a steep
decline in its net worth, potentially worsened by the bailout only days
before, which severely damaged Cypriot banking, one of its most valuable
68 Id.
69 Communication from the Commission: Updating of Data Used to Calculate Lump Sum
and Penalty Payments to be Proposed by the Commission to the Court of Justice in
Infringement Proceedings, European Comm’n, at 3, SEC (2012) 6106.
70 The duration to be taken into account begins with the period from the date of the first
judgment. See C-304/02, Commission v. France, E.C.R. I-6263 (2005), ¶¶ 81, 102,108.
71 Communication from the Commission, supra note 69; European Comm’n Communication,
Implementation of Article 260(3) TFEU, SEC (2010) 1371.
72 See Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community art. 205(2), Dec. 12, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321).
73 Application of Article 228 of the EC Treaty, at ¶ 18.1, SEC (2005) 1658.
74 Id. ¶ 18.
75 The full formula can be seen at European Commission Communication, id. ¶ 18, n.18.
76 Id. ¶ 18.1.
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sectors.77 In February 2013, the Commission itself reported an expected
downturn in the Cypriot GDP of -3.5% in 2013.78 However, by May 2013
it had revised its expectations to a -8.7% downturn in GDP in 2013, a
much higher figure representing the scale of the economic loss in Cyprus.79
Nevertheless, since the penalty proposal was issued in March 2013,80 the
latter figures could not have been used. This means that for the purposes
of the penalty calculation, the GDP of Cyprus may have been deemed to
be much larger than later realized and not proportionate to its “capacity
to pay,” resulting in a significantly higher fine than if updated (and more
accurate) GDP figures had been used. The Commission was obliged in
such circumstances to request a daily penalty on Cyprus of €11,404, only
days after the national financial rescue by the EU and the International
Monetary Fund (“IMF”).81 Though the point was not to make an example
of Cyprus per se, what it demonstrated in reality was that in the pursuit
of the achievement of the Renewable Energy Directive, the Commission
could allow no leeway for Member States to avoid, delay or mitigate pen-
alties, even if their nation was crippled with economic disasters.82
March 2013 also saw the Commission propose a much higher fine
on the Polish Government. After repeated warnings,83 Poland was also
referred to the court for punishment with a daily penalty of €133,228.80 for
its infringements.84 The development of Poland’s national strategic plan to
achieve their renewable energy targets had been delayed following political
contention.85 Having traditionally relied upon coal for ninety percent of its
energy supply86 and now having to comply with several EU regulations
77 See CENT. BANK OF CYPRUS, ECONOMIC BULLETIN 9 (June 2013), available at http://
www.centralbank.gov.cy/media/pdf/ENG_EB_JUN13_V2.pdf.
78 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC FORECAST: WINTER 2013, EUROPEAN COMM’N 56–57 (2013), avail-
able at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee1
_en.pdf.
79 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC FORECAST: SPRING 2013, EUROPEAN COMM’N, 64–65 (2013), avail-
able at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee2
_en.pdf.
80 See Renewable Energy, supra note 8.
81 EU Approves Multibillion-Euro Cyprus Rescue Package, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2013), http://
rt.com/business/eurozone-cyprus-bailout-terms-754/.
82 Application of Article 228 of the EC Treaty, supra note 73, ¶ 18.
83 Finnish, Greek and Polish Legislation, supra note 54.
84 Renewable Energy, supra note 8.
85 Poland on Collision Course with Brussels over ‘Illegal’ Coal Plant, EURACTIV (Aug. 22,
2013), http://www.euractiv.com/energy/poland-collision-course-brussels-news-529895.
86 North American Firms Quit Shale Gas Fracking in Poland, BBC (May 8, 2013), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22459629 (Poland’s confidence in a US-style shale revolution
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including the Renewable Energy Directive and the Carbon Capture and
Storage Directive,87 Poland has found the switch to renewable energy
production difficult to adhere to and to justify to its electorate.88 The
Court of Justice was called upon by a journalist at the International Bar
Association to make a “robust ruling . . . [to] help redress the balance in
favour of renewables [in Poland].”89 This view suggests that a stringent
punishment by the Court of Justice may be required to push Poland to
comply with its obligations under the Directive. To avoid such delays in
reporting about national transpositions to meet the Renewable Energy
Directive, and therefore avoid having to enforce the matter in court, in
March 2013 the Commission began its obligation90 to produce progress
reports which would be published every two years to keep track of Member
States’ efforts.91
The Commission has also been forceful and persistent in taking
action against Member States breaching directives related to the Renew-
able Energy Directive that would hinder the achievement of its objec-
tives.92 Poland was again referred93 to the Court of Justice with heavy
proposed financial penalties—a daily fine of €88,819.20—for infringing
the EU Gas Directive.94 They are further being pressed by the Commission
diminished following disappointing exploratory results); Poland on Collision Course with
Brussels over ‘Illegal’ Coal Plant, supra note 85 (Poland’s Prime Minister remained de-
termined to rely on coal, using newer, more efficient technology to source its energy, and
planned to build new coal power plants which risked infringing the CCS Directive).
87 Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009
on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide and Amending Council Directive 85/337/
EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC,
2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC, and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, June 5, 2009, art. 1, 2, 2009
O.J. (L 140).
88 Poland on Collision Course with Brussels over ‘Illegal’ Coal Plant, supra note 85.
89 Polly Botsford, Will Poland’s Revised Energy Law Pass the EU Test?, INT’L BAR ASS’N,
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=4f12dd4d-229b-4e27-b906-9e6c2
66891a1 (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
90 Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September
2001 on the Promotion of Electricity Produced from Renewable Energy Sources in the
Internal Electricity Market, Oct. 27, 2001, art. 3(4), 2001 O.J. (L 283) 33–40.
91 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2013) 175 final
(Mar. 27, 2013).
92 Press Release, European Comm’n, Internal Gas Market: The Commission Takes Poland
to Court over Regulated Gas Prices for Business Consumers (June 20, 2013), http://europa
.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-580_en.htm.
93 Id.
94 Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009
Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas and Repealing Directive
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to comply with other EU laws related to the achievement of the reduction
in GhG emissions and the switch to renewable energy, such as compli-
ance with fluorinated GhGs95 regulations.96
Other Member States have also been pursued by the Commission97
with proposed punishments, such as Finland which the Commission pro-
posed both €32,140.80 and €28,569.60 daily fines for infringements of the
EU Electricity Directive98 and EU Gas Directive respectively.99 Finland
subsequently made considerable amendments to its legislation, showing
that strict enforcement methods can have the desired impact on Member
States.100 It is both the duty of the Commission to ensure Member States
comply with EU legislation, and in applying the rules promptly and effi-
ciently their efforts are designed to force compliance to achieve some de-
gree of energy self-sufficiency in Europe.
IV. UNITED STATES
Any comparison with the United States’ experiences towards
achieving the same target could determine that its push towards shale
has enabled policymakers to take the eye off the ball in achieving re-
newable energy targets.101 Arguably the EU has more directly focused on
2003/55/EC, Aug. 14, 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 211).
95 Memo/12/876, Climate Change: Commission Calls for Poland to Comply with EU Leg-
islation on Fluorinated Greenhouse Gases, European Comm’n (Nov. 21, 2012), http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-876_en.htm?local=EN.
96 Regulation (EC) No 842/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May
2006 on Certain Fluorinated Greenhouse Gases (as amended), June 14, 2006, 2006 O.J.
(L 161).
97 Finnish, Greek and Polish Legislation, supra note 54.
98 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009
Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity and Repealing Directive
2003/54/EC, Aug. 14, 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 112) 55–56.
99 Press Release, European Comm’n, Internal Energy Market: Commission Refers Poland
and Finland to Court for Failing to Fully Transpose EU Rules (Nov. 21, 2012), http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1236_en.htm.
100 To comply with the various directives, Finland introduced the Electricity Market Act
(sähkömarkkinalaki 588/2013), the Act to amend the Natural Gas Market Act (laki
maakaasumarkkinalain muuttamisesta 589/2013), the new Electricity and Gas Market
Supervision Act (laki sähkö—ja maakaasumarkkinoiden valvonnasta 590/2013) and the
Act on the Energy Market Authority (laki energiamarkkinavirastosta 591/2013). See Finland
to Fully Transpose the Electricity Market Directive—Ensuring Effective Competition in
the Electricity Market, MERILAMPI (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.merilampi.com/newsletter
-articles?article=33805046.
101 Amy Myers Jaffe, Shale Gas Will Rock the World, WALL ST. J., http://altecheco.com
/placed_images/pdf/How%20Shale%20Gas.pdf (last updated May 10, 2013).
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achieving a renewable energy solution to sustain energy needs than
the United States, which has enjoyed the shale boom to minimize net
energy import.102
Despite multiple attempts to pass similar renewable energy leg-
islation, the United States appears to have been relatively unsuccessful
in terms of its legislative outcomes. The American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009103 came close to mirroring some parts of the EU
Renewable Energy Directive, requiring twenty percent of electricity to be
produced from renewables by 2020.104 It was defeated, and several other
attempts to pass ambitious renewable energy legislation have not seen
fruition, such as the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act,105 the
American Power Act,106 and the Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012.107
While related energy legislation and standards are in force in the United
States,108 there is no clear comparison in terms of determined and far-
reaching legislation.109 However, in promising United States energy inde-
pendence by 2020, President Obama has made a vast policy commitment
that America seems on track to complete and is within the United States’
economic interests,110 though not necessarily in an environmentally sus-
tainable manner.111
102 See Richard Youngs, The EU’s Global Climate and Energy Policies: Gathering or Losing
Momentum?, in THE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY chapter 13, 14 (Andreas
Goldtha ed., 2013).
103 The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2009).
104 Id. at Title I.
105 Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act of 2009, S.1733, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009).
106 The American Power Act of 2010, 111th Cong. (June 2010).
107 Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012, S. 2146, 112th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2012).
108 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2010 (Oct. 2011);
Joshua Freed et al., A Clean Energy Standard: Getting the United States Back into the
Clean Energy Race, THIRD WAY (Mar. 2011), http://content.thirdway.org/publications/382
/Third_Way_Policy_Memo_-_A_Clean_Energy_Standard-Getting_the_United_States
_Back_into_the_Clean_Energy_Race.pdf.
109 See Cary Coglianese & Jocelyn D’Ambrosio, Policymaking Under Pressure: The Perils
of Incremental Responses to Climate Change, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1420–27 (2008).
110 Mark E. Rosen, Energy Independence and Climate Change: The Economic and National
Security Consequences of Failing to Act, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 977 (2010).
111 For a discussion of U.S. energy policy, see Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominat Model of
United States Energy Policy, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 335 (1990); Jonathan B. Wiener, Think
Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961 (2006);
Lincoln L. Davies, Tracing U.S. Renewable Energy Policy, 43 ENVTL. REP. 10320–27 (2013).
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CONCLUSION: LONG-TERMISM
The European Commission has used every tool available to ensure
that Member States amend their legislation, infrastructure, and admin-
istration to comply with the EU Renewable Energy Directive. This has
required repeated warnings to Member States with the threat of legal
action, name-and-shame publications for offenders, and policy guidance.112
Finally and most importantly, the use of the European Court of Justice
has been the last point of call to ensure that the accountability of Member
States is upheld and that Member States are penalized for their breaches
for non-compliance.
Member States have been referred to the court for significant pun-
ishments, despite what they may have regarded as legitimate excuses for
compliance failures, such as the economic meltdown of their economy.
The Commission neither had the grounds nor inclination to permit ex-
cuses. In carrying out its duty, even through the financial crises that
have rocked the global and political economy, the achievement of the
directive has been paramount. The forcefulness of the Commission has
personified the seriousness of which governing policy in the EU treats
renewable energy rule-breakers.
The EU’s policy is evidence of choosing a long-term view, rather
than relaxing environmental regulations in the short term to enable
European businesses to cut costs and encourage a return to growth. It
has ignored the short-term temptations of regulation relaxation and taken
a long-term view, even at risk of economic pain. The EU has also resisted
the temptation of joining the shale boom, demonstrating its commitment
to a cleaner and environmentally conscious economic recovery. It is de-
termined instead to switch to renewable energy, which could slash the
EU’s exorbitant energy import bill and help achieve its GhG emissions
targets. It may be that the United States will achieve the former before
the latter. Not only may the environment suffer as a consequence, but
the United States may fall behind in the race to develop and produce
technology and expertise in renewable technology—an industry that is
set to grow rapidly as the world embraces renewables.113
112 There has been criticism of the lack of guidance to achieve the Directive’s Objectives.
See Gerard Wynn, EU Law Unclear on Integrating Renewable Power: Wynn, REUTERS
(Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/16/column-wynn-germany-solar
-idUSL5N0HC13P20130916.
113 Chris Bryan, RWE to Halve Dividend Amid Renewables Boom, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 20,
2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6276f72e-21be-11e3-bb64-00144feab7de.html#axzz
2uPPSczFJ.
